This paper develops a theoretical foundation for the social cost of carbon (SCC). The model highlights the source of debate over whether countries should use the global or domestic SCC for regulatory impact analysis. I identify conditions under which a country's decision to internalize the global SCC, as currently practiced in the United States, is individually rational. Nevertheless, I show how obtaining international consensus on a particular value will be more challenging than often appreciated. I introduce the notion of "strategic SCC" to re ‡ect each country's preference for a globally internalized shadow value on emissions conditional on a true value of the global SCC and a distribution of the domestic SCCs among countries. While all countries have a strategic SCC greater than their domestic SCC, a country's strategic SCC can be greater than or less than the global SCC. How these preferences translate into agreement depends on institutional arrangements for collective decision-making, for which I provide empirical evidence based on various decision rules, including those at the World Bank. A central contribution of the paper is demonstration of the need for more research on the theoretical underpinnings of the SCC, because establishing and using the SCC among sovereign countries is not simply an application of estimating and internalizing an externality.
Introduction
Individual agents across the planet have little or no incentive to internalize the global costs of their own climate-changing emissions. From this perspective, the problem of climate change is the problem of a global externality. The "social cost of carbon" (SCC) is a concept that re ‡ects the marginal external costs of emissions: it represents the monetized damage caused by each additional unit of carbon dioxide, or the carbon equivalent of another greenhouse gas, emitted into the atmosphere. Many countries have begun accounting for the SCC in regulatory impact analyses of domestic policy. A recent OECD survey found that at least 13 countries account for carbon externalities when conducting cost-bene…t analysis (CBA) of investment projects in the transportation or energy sectors (Smith and Braathen 2015) . 1 Several countries-including the United States-report taking account of the SCC more generally in ex ant CBA of public policies. 2 As shown in Figure 1 , the SCC estimates di¤er across countries, but increase signi…cantly over time as the damages are expected to increase. The important observation for purposes of this paper is that these countries take into account an estimate of the global bene…ts of reducing CO 2 emissions (i.e., avoided damages worldwide) when conducting CBA of domestic regulations.
There is, however, growing debate about whether the global SCC is appropriate for bene…t-cost analysis of domestic policy. The practice is justi…ed on the basis that climate change is a unique problem because of its scale as a global externality; that application of the global SCC among all countries would lead to globally e¢ cient emissions; and that climate policy takes place in the context of international relations where one country's actions are used to leverage those of others, and no one country can solve the problem of climate change alone (Interagency Working Group 2010; Greenstone et al., 2013; Pizer et al. 2014) . The other side of the debate emphasizes that using global bene…ts is a departure from the conventional practice of regulatory impact analysis, especially in the United States, where bene…t-cost analysis has focused traditionally on comparing domestic bene…ts and costs (Dudley and Mannix 2014; Gayer and Viscusi 2015; Darmstadter 2016; Fraas et al. 2016) . 3 The critics argue that unilateral policy for any one country should account for only the domestic share of the SCC, and that broadening the scope to include global bene…ts has potentially far reaching implications for the (mis)allocation of societal resources. 4 Questions also arise about consistency with individual rationality (i.e., self interest) from any one country's perspective.
Despite the widespread use of the SCC for evaluating climate policy, and the emerging debate about its appropriate scope, there is surprisingly little research on the theoretical basis of the SCC and how it should be used for policy analysis. The existing literature focuses almost exclusively on producing empirical estimates and re…ning the underlying methods employed in integrated assessment models (IAMs). This paper, in contrast, develops a theoretical foundation for the SCC to highlight points of disagreement in the debate over whether countries should use the global or domestic SCC. Moreover, I identify conditions under which a country's decision to internalize the global SCC is individually rational, yet also show how obtaining international consensus on a particular value of the global SCC will be more challenging than often appreciated.
The next section begins with the basic setup of a static model where each country chooses its emissions policy, recognizing that aggregate emissions generate a global public "bad."The setup makes immediately clear the distinction between global and domestic de…nitions of the SCC. A useful feature of the model is the way it clari…es how emissions produce a global externality from the perspective of individual agents, but a global public bad from the perspective of countries. Analysis in Section 3 shows how internalizing the global SCC is consistent with Pareto optimality of global emissions, and internalizing the domestic SCC is consistent with a Nash equilibrium among countries on their choice of emissions. I then use the model in Section 4 to show potential distributional e¤ects of moving from equilibrium to e¢ cient emissions, along with suggestive empirical evidence based on the regional calibration in the C-DICE model (Nordhaus 2015) .
Section 5 moves directly to questions about individual rationality and a country's choice of internalizing the global or domestic SCC. I extend the basic model in two ways to account for the real-world institutional context where climate policy and international negotiations take place. First, building on the international relations argument for leadership and leverage, I replace the assumption of Nash behavior among countries with conjectures about how other countries will respond to one's own choice of emissions. Second, taking account of the dynamic way that countries will make emission decisions over time, I extend the static setup of the model to a repeated game and consider basic Folk theorem results. Both modeling approaches show that a country's choice to internalize the global SCC can be individually rational. The results provide what is to the best of my knowledge the …rst formally derived microeconomic justi…cation for countries to internalize the global SCC, and the necessary conditions are informative for policy design.
But on what value of the global SCC should we expect countries to agree? From an economics perspective, the SCC is generally perceived as an objective parameter, the estimates of which are limited primarily by empirical methods and data availability. 5 For political purposes, however, seeking the one right estimate of the global SCC fails to recognize strategic incentives on the part of countries. In Section 6, I introduce the notion of "strategic SCC" to re ‡ect each country's preference for a globally internalized shadow value on emissions conditional on a true value of the global SCC and on a distribution of the domestic SCCs among countries. While all countries have a strategic SCC greater than their domestic SCC, a country's strategic SCC can be greater than or less than the global SCC. How these preferences translate into agreement therefore depends on institutional arrangements for collective decision-making, for which I provide some empirical evidence based again on the C-DICE model and various decision rules. I also discuss immediate implications of the results for debates currently underway in multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank, about how to account for climate-change impacts in program evaluation.
In the …nal section, I conclude the paper with a summary of the main results and policy implications. A central …nding is that internalizing the global SCC when setting domestic policy or conducting regulatory impact analysis can be in a country's own self interest. This builds support for current practice in the United States and other countries. There is, however, a need for more research on the theoretical basis of the SCC and its use for policy analysis. The analysis here demonstrates how establishing and using the global SCC among sovereign nations is not simply an application of estimating and internalizing an externality.
The Model Setup
I construct the simplest model possible to illustrate the key ideas. Countries are indexed i = 1; :::; n with n 2. Each country has emissions x i , and the initial version of the model is static. 6 The aggregate level of emissions, X = P n i=1 x i = x i + X i , is a global public "bad." This means that emissions anywhere on the planet a¤ect all countries, and I assume the impact on each country is negative. The damages of emissions in country i are D i (X) = i X, where i > 0, and the linearity assumption is made for simplicity. The bene…ts of emissions in country
for simplicity, that both the bene…ts and damages are measured in equivalent monetary units. A few observations are useful about the country-level speci…cation of damage and bene…t functions. The damage function for each country can be written as consisting of two terms, D i (X) = i X i + i x i . The …rst term re ‡ects the damage in country i from emissions in all other countries. The second term re ‡ects the damage in country i from its own emissions. While the damages with a domestic origin are internal to the country, they are external to individual agents within the country. Internalizing domestic damages from domestic emissions therefore requires some form of government intervention. The interventions can be either quantity-or price-based. A quantity-based policy would set x i in ways consistent with, for example, direct regulation or a cap-and-trade program. A price-based policy would set a per-unit price p i on emissions (e.g., a carbon tax) that would determine a country's emissions according to x i (p i ) = fx i : B 0 i (x i ) = p i g, which represents each country's demand for emissions.
The simple setup of this model makes immediately clear the di¤erences between two notions of the social cost of carbon:
De…nition 1 (DSCC) The Domestic Social Cost of Carbon is i for all i.
Both the DSCC and the GSCC provide a measure of monetized, marginal damages from emissions, but di¤er in their political and therefore geographic scope. The DSCC measures the marginal damages to each country individually, whereas the GSCC measures the global marginal damages, which are the sum of the DSCCs across all countries.
Most of the empirical evidence on the GSCC comes from IAMs. Although IAMs are not without critics (Pindyck 2013 (Pindyck , 2015 , they provide the leading approach among researchers and policymakers for estimating the GSCC (Metcalf and Stock, 2015) . Indeed, the U.S. estimates of the GSCC used in regulatory impact assessment are based on a synthesis analysis of three di¤erent IAMs (Interagency Working Group 2013). 7 The central estimate of the GSCC, based on a 3-percent discount rate, is $40 (in 2014$s) per metric ton of CO 2 emitted in 2015, with the number increasing in future years.
As the IAMs have become more detailed over time, greater e¤orts have been made to increase the spatial resolution of costs and bene…ts. Speci…cally, several models calculate estimates of the DSCC for di¤erent countries, or in most cases regions. Nordhaus (2014) summarizes the regional SCC estimates for di¤erent models and observes that while there is little consensus on the distribution of the GSCC by region, no one region or country appears to dominate the total. Subsequently, Nordhaus (2015) merges the results to derive a regional decomposition of the GSCC based on an average of three models. 8 I report the distribution in Figure 2 to provide a sense of the empirical heterogeneity in the DSCC, recognizing that some estimates are for regions rather than countries. The estimates range from nearly 14 percent of the GSCC for the European Union to less than 1 percent for South Africa. The …gure also illustrates how the percentage distribution partitions the GSCC of $40 among di¤erent countries or regions. 9 For example, the United States share is about $4.24. Across the distribution, Nordhaus (2015) observes that the estimates are roughly proportional to discounted Gross Domestic Products (GDPs), with deviations based on geographic di¤erences in climate sensitivity.
3 E¢ ciency vs. Equilibrium I now consider how the di¤erent measures of the social cost of carbon-the GSCC and the DSCCs-relate to globally e¢ cient and equilibrium levels of emissions policy. I begin with globally e¢ ciency and the GSCC, before turning to equilibrium policies and the DSCCs. To simultaneously account for quantity-or price-based policies, I consider the shadow value on emissions, denoted s i , that each country internalizes. The choice of s i maps into a quantity-based instrument according to the demand function for emissions x i (s i ) and directly into a price-based instrument with s i = p i . 
Pareto Optimality
Pareto optimality in global emissions must maximize aggregate surplus, which in this case is simply maximizing the net bene…ts in a monetary unit. We can think of this as akin to maximizing global GDP net of climate damages. The e¢ ciency objective is to coordinate the internalized, shadow value of emissions among all countries to solve max s 1 ;:::;sn
(1)
Assuming an interior solution (here and throughout), the conditions that de…ne the solution (s 1 ; :::; s n ) can be combined as follows:
The result is intuitive: the marginal bene…t of emissions is equated across all countries and equal to the sum of the marginal damages of emissions. 10 Using each country's demand function for emissions, it is straightforward to see the further implication that satisfying (2) requires s i = A for all i. That is, all countries must internalize the GSCC, which then de…nes a unique level of Pareto optimal emissions for each country x i = x i (s i ) and thus aggregate emissions, X = P n i=1 x i . This, of course, is the e¢ ciency argument in support of all countries internalizing the GSCC for domestic policy.
Although a bit of an aside, it is worth pointing out that the e¢ ciency conditions in (2) are related to, and yet distinct from, the standard condition for optimal provision of a public good (bad). The classic Samuelson condition would equate the sum of the marginal bene…ts of reducing the public bad to the marginal costs of doing so. In this case, the sum of the marginal bene…ts corresponds to A, but, in contrast to the Samuelson condition, these marginal bene…ts equal the marginal costs of reducing emissions (foregone bene…ts) in all countries, which themselves must all be equal. The di¤erence arises here because the marginal costs of abatement come from sources within each country separately rather than from a uniform price or market supply curve. This is why there are n conditions in (2) rather than the single Samuelson condition.
Nash Equilibrium
I now turn to the problem that each country faces based on its own self interest. While Pareto optimal emissions maximize aggregate surplus, individual countries are focused on maximizing their own net bene…ts. I begin with the Nash assumption whereby each country takes the emissions (policy) of others as given. Each country's problem can be written as
The important feature of this objective function is that each country accounts for its DSCC from global emissions rather than the GSCC. The unique solution
costs of abatement in terms of utility (see Chichilnisky and Heal 1994) . In this case, each country's demand for emissions implies thatŝ i = i for all i. 11 That is, each country chooses to internalize its DSCC, implying domestic emissions levelsx i = x i (ŝ i ) for all i and global emissionsX = P n i=1x i . It is straightforward to see that equilibrium emissions are ine¢ ciently high in all countries. This follows immediately from the facts that s i = A > i =ŝ i and x 0 i (s i ) < 0 for all i. The result also follows intuitively because emissions provide a global public bad, the marginal damages of which no one country has the incentive to fully internalize with the setup in (3). In other words, every country has an incentive to free ride rather than internalize more than its own costs.
It is worth noting that the characterization of a global public bad di¤ers somewhat from a global externality, and this is due the level of analysis taking place among countries rather than individuals. The standard de…nition of an externality means that agents take no account of any external damages of their actions. But here each country experiences some of the marginal damages from its own emissions, in addition to damages from the emissions of other countries. This explains why countries will, to some extent, constrain their own equilibrium emissions with a choice of s i > 0, rather than s i = 0, which would have emissions increase until B 0 i (x i ) = 0. Nevertheless, individual agents within each country do not have such an incentive because they experience an in…nitesimally small fraction of damages from their own emissions. Figure 3 illustrates the idea of free riding on abatement in the form of a 11 Notice that each country's choice ofŝ i and thereforex i depends on i but not X i . This is an important implication of the assumed linearity of damage functions. While the assumption simpli…es the analysis greatly, it should be recognized that, more generally, each country's choice would be a best-response function that depends on the emissions of other countries. Figure 4 : Example where Pareto optimality of internalizing the GSCC is not a Pareto improvement classic prisoners'dilemma. There are n = 2 identical countries, and each faces the choice of internalizing its DSCC or the GSCC. In this example, both countries are better o¤ if they both choose the GSCC (the Pareto optimal solution), but doing so is not a Nash equilibrium. The payo¤s are such that both countries have a dominant strategy to choose the DSCC, resulting in a Nash equilibrium where both countries obtain a lower payo¤.
Distributional Considerations
It is well recognized that the globally e¢ cient level of emissions is not an equilibrium. Generally less well known is that all countries would not necessarily prefer the e¢ cient level of emissions, even if it could be sustained. Figure 4 modi…es the payo¤s to the prisoners'dilemma to illustrate a simple example. Pareto optimality occurs if both countries choose the GSCC, were the combined payo¤s are maximized, but the Nash equilibrium still occurs when both countries choose their respective DSCC. The di¤erence arises now because Country B is actually worse o¤ at the Pareto optimal outcome compared to the Nash equilibrium. Without a transfer from Country A to Country B (of at least one unit of payo¤), the problem is one of distribution in addition to free riding.
I now consider more generally the potential distributional e¤ects upon moving from equilibrium to e¢ cient emissions. Let us de…ne the respective net bene…ts for each country asv
The simplest and most intuitive case is that of all identical countries because the e¢ cient level of emissions will always Pareto dominate the equilibrium. By Figure 5 : A country's net bene…ts at Pareto optimal and Nash equilibrium emissions with n identical countries symmetry, each country will have same level of equilibrium emissions and the same level of Pareto optimal emissions. We can therefore dispense with subscripts for the time being to show that
where the inequality follows becausex > x , n = B 0 (x ) by (2), and B 00 (x) < 0.
In other words, for each country, the avoided damages of lower global emissions (the …rst term) more than o¤set the foregone bene…ts of further reducing its own emissions (the second term). Figure 5 illustrates the result graphically. The result is also quite intuitive upon recognizing that maximizing the sum of net bene…ts among identical countries is equivalent to maximizing the net bene…t for each individual country. There is, however, no such general result with heterogenous countries. The more general formulation of (5) and (6) for all i is
where the signs of the di¤erent parts of the expression follow becausex i > x i for all countries, B 0 i (x i ) = i by (4), and B 00 i (x i ) < 0. The important observation is that the overall sign of (8) can be either positive or negative.
Notwithstanding the indeterminate sign, the terms in (8) are useful for building intuition about when a country could be made worse-or better-o¤ upon moving to the globally e¢ cient level of emissions, without transfers. The …rst part of (8), which is positive, represents the "spillin" bene…ts that a country receives from the emission reductions in other countries. The term is bigger when country i experiences greater marginal damages from emissions and other countries reduce their emissions more. The second braced part of (8) is the net private cost to country i. The …rst term is the bene…t of reducing its own emissions, and the second term is the foregone bene…t from reducing emissions. The net e¤ect is always negative, and the magnitude is increasing in the size of the externality being internalized, A i ,which follows because x i !x i as A i ! 0.
The more general concept underlying these di¤erent possibilities is that moving to a Pareto optimal allocation need not imply a Pareto improvement. It does, however, imply that a Pareto improvement is possible with transfers. We know that P n i=1 v i > P n i=1v i even if it does not hold that v i >v i for all i. It is therefore possible for redistribution of the surplus such that all countries are at least as well o¤ as they were in the initial equilibrium. Indeed, the di¤erences v i v i for all i can provide a foundation for thinking about climate …nance as transfers in an internal setting. In particular, we know there exists a set of transfers ( 1 ; :::; n ) such that P n i=1 i = 0 and v i v i + i 0 for all i, holding strictly for at least some i.
Let us for the moment consider some simulation-based empirical evidence. I employ the basic set up in Nordhaus (2015) Nordhaus (2015, Table B-4) . 12 With this setup, I solve for equilibrium and Pareto optimal emissions for each country and report the results of interest in Figure 6 . Panel A shows each country's abatement of moving from equilibrium to Pareto optimal emissions, i.e.,x i x i . Overall emissions decline by 22 percent, and the …gure shows the percentage of the total reduction attributable to each country. For example, 26 percent of the reduction comes from China and 9 percent from the European Union. Panel B shows the change in welfare v i v i measured in billions of dollars. While India gains the most, South Africa, Eurasia, and China are all made worse o¤ without transfers. Clearly, the net bene…ts exceed costs across all countries.
Rationalizing the GSCC
Can it ever be individually rational for a country to internalize more than its DSCC, perhaps even the GSCC? With the model considered thus far, the question is equivalent to asking whether cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma can be individually rational. The answer, of course, is "no," without modi…cation to the model's setup. In this section, I show how basic changes to the model that re ‡ect the real-world institutional context where climate policy and international negotiations take place can produce a di¤erent result. My aim is to illustrate simple possibilities that can spur further theoretical research on this increasingly important, policy-relevant question.
Conjectural Variations
We have heretofore assumed Nash behavior among countries-that is, each country assumes that its choice of s i and therefore x i will have no a¤ect on the emissions of other countries. But this assumption ignores the potential importance of international relations where some countries may reduce their emissions to leverage reductions from other countries. One way to account for this relationship is 12 The bene…ts of emissions are given by B i (x i ) = q i i 2 i q i , where q i is GDP in 2011 and i = ( x i x i )= x i is the emissions intensity relative to 2011 levels denoted by x i . The parameter i is the abatement cost parameter that comes from McKinsey (2009) and averaged for the 2020 and 2030 estimates. It is straightforward to verify that the bene…ts function satis…es the required properties for all x i x i . to employ a conjectural variations approach.
Assume that country i has a conjecture about how other countries will change their level of emissions given a change in its own emissions. 13 Here I consider the choices of x i directly (rather than s i ) in order to simplify notation. The simplest way to characterize the conjecture is with a linear relationship between country i's chosen level of emissions and its expectation about the emissions of others, denotedX i . Speci…cally, we can write dX i =dx i = i > 0 to capture the way that a country believes a decrease (increase) in its own emissions will decrease (increase) the emissions of other countries. 14 Note that Nash behavior is consistent with i = 0 for all i. It follows thatX i = i x i + i , where i is some constant of integration.
Each country i then solves
and the solution will satisfy
Comparing this …rst-order condition with (4) shows how the positive relationship between x i andX i means that a country will internalize more than the DSCC when setting its own emissions policy. The presence of i i on the right-hand side re ‡ects the additional, marginal disincentive to increase emissions: the expectation that other countries will increase their emissions too-by i at a cost of i . There is also an important knife-edge result where a country will take account of exactly the GSCC. If i = A i = i , then expression (9) is equivalent to (2) for country i. In other words, if a country expects a decrease in its own emissions to decrease that of all others in proportion to the ratio of its external cost of emissions to its internal costs, then it is individually rational for the country to internalize the GSCC. Moreover, if the expectation were to hold for all i, then all countries would internalize the GSCC, and global emissions would be Pareto optimal.
It is worth brie ‡y mentioning how the conjectural variations solution relates to other solutions for solving public goods problems. The most noteworthy is a Lindahl equilibrium. Although often discussed as pertaining to individualized prices for providing a public good, Lindahl's thought experiment can be motivated using quantities rather than prices (see, for example, Cornes and Sandler 1996) . Assume that each country is permitted a share of global emissions, i = x i =X, that is determined exogenously and P n i=1 i = 1. A Lindahl equilibrium, which by de…nition implements Pareto optimal emissions, then arises if i = i =A for all i. 15 Di¤erentiating the share equation, it holds that dX i =dx i = (1 i )= i = i , so the di¤erence between Lindahl shares (which also de…ne an optimal burdensharing agreement) and the conjectural variation parameter is therefore a matter of interpretation.
There are, however, some well-known shortcomings of the conjectural variations approach. The most obvious is that a country's conjecture is arbitrary and possibly incorrect. But this criticism should be considered in light of the fact that the assumption of Nash behavior can also be interpreted as quite arbitrary and perhaps more questionable in the context of international climate policy, where some degree reciprocity among countries is clearly at work. There are also concerns about whether conjectures are consistent with optimal responses at an equilibrium (Sugden 1985; Scafuri 1988) , but these concerns re ‡ect a more general criticism. Because conjectural variations are based on the idea that agents (i.e., countries) respond to one another in some particular way, arguments are often made that capturing the underlying idea is more appropriate through explicit modeling of a repeated game. 16
A Repeated Game
International negotiations to mitigate climate change clearly have a repeated game aspect whereby countries set emission targets period after period. 17 As mentioned previously, the one-period game can be interpreted as a single long 15 To see this, solve max xi fB i (x i ) i Xg, where X = x i = i and i = i =A, to verify the solution is x i for all i. 16 Itaya and Okamura (2003) show speci…c cases in which the conjectural variations equilibrium is observationally equivalent to the strategies played in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the underlying repeated game for voluntary provision of a public good. 17 See Barrett (1994 Barrett ( , 2003 for some of the early treatments and discussion of international environmental agreements as a repeated game. period, but in this subsection, I extend the model to a repeated game. To keep things as simple as possible, I consider only pure and stationary strategies, denoted as either (x 1 ; :::; x n ) or (x i ; x i ) in more compact notation. All countries are assumed to have the discount factor 2 (0; 1), complete information, and perfect recall of the history of play.
Assuming either an in…nitely repeated game or one with an uncertain duration, 18 the discounted payo¤ to country i can be written as
A standard and immediate result is that the Nash equilibrium level of emissions in the stage game for all countries, (x 1 ; :::;x n ), constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium in the repeated game, and this result holds for any and prior history of emissions. This is consistent with all countries choosing to internalize the DSCC in the repeated game. I now consider whether the choice of something greater than the DSCC-in particular, the GSCC-can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium. A natural place to begin is with Nash reversion strategies. All countries choose a level of emissions (x 1 ; :::; x n ) in each period until one country deviates, at which point all countries revert to (x 1 ; :::;x n ) for all periods thereafter. Whether continually choosing (x 1 ; :::; x n )-and therefore an implied SCC for each countryconstitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium depends on whether any country has an incentive to deviate in any period. The necessary and su¢ cient condition to avoid deviation can be written as
The left-hand side is the maximum gain from deviating in one period, and the right-hand side is the discounted future loses from reversion beginning in the next period. Substituting (10) into (11) and rearranging yields a useful variant of the same relationship:
The left-hand side is always non-negative and converges to zero as ! 1. Hence whether the condition can be satis…ed depends on whether the right-hand side is positive. This simple observation produces several results. The …rst is that choosing to internalize more than the DSCC can be individually rational for all countries if is su¢ ciently large. To prove this, let x i =x i + dx for all i. It follows that dv i =dx = i (1 n) < 0, and the right-hand side of (12) is positive for all i if dx < 0. This means that continually choosing (x 1 ; :::; x n ) < (x 1 ; :::;x n ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium if is su¢ ciently close to 1. In other words, if countries care enough about the future, then in the repeated game, it is individually rational to emit less than the Nash equilibrium in the stage game, and this is equivalent to internalizing more than the DSCC. 19 While this may not be the …rst-best solution, the point is that countries are no longer stuck with only their DSCCs in the repeated game.
The second set of results relate speci…cally to the GSCC. If, as discussed in Section 4, it holds that v i v i for all i, and is su¢ ciently large, then (x 1 ; :::; x n ) constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium. Hence choosing to internalize the GSCC can be individually rational. Moreover, even if v i <v i for some i, transfers of the form de…ned previously, where v i v i + i > 0 for all i, can also support internalizing the GSCC in a repeated game. The overall intuition for these results is that if countries are concerned about the future and interact repeatedly, they will choose long-term cooperation over short-term gain.
There are many results applicable here from the literature on repeated games and the Folk Theorem. I have used what is perhaps the simplest setup to potentially rationalize a country's internalization of the GSCC, or at least something greater than the DSCC. The results highlight the importance of repeated interaction, complete information, and the potential use of transfers. It may be no coincidence therefore that each of these conditions featured prominently in the most recent United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreement in Paris. The agreement has detailed provisions about the schedule for renewed commitments, mechanisms to improve information acquisition and dissemination, and commitments for climate …nance to developing countries.
A promising line of future research is to consider alternative punishment schemes to Nash reversion and thereby allowing the study of more general insights of Folk Theorem type results. 20 Further research would also be useful that considers the e¤ect of imperfect monitoring. Mailath and Samuelson (2006) provide a good starting point with their treatment of public and private monitoring, which in this case would capture realistic challenges for monitoring and reporting of emissions data through multilateral entities or countries themselves.
Strategic SCC
With the exception of the choice of a discount rate in IAMs, empirical estimates of the GSCC are generally understood to be the result of positive rather than normative analysis. The existing research focuses on improving empirical methods and expanding data availability to provide better estimation (Pizer et al. 2014; Burke et al. 2016) . Within a political context, however, seeking the one right estimate of the GSCC fails to recognize the strategic incentives on the part of sovereign countries. Even with a true GSCC, countries will in general have di¤erent preferences for a globally internalized shadow value on emissions. In this section, I introduce the notion of a strategic SCC (SSCC) to de…ne the concept. I then relate the SSCC to the other SCC measures and consider empirical evidence and policy implications.
One way to think about the task at hand is to consider each country's preference for the level of a uniform and globally implemented carbon tax, where each country retains its own tax revenue. The problem is similar that in Weitzman (2014, 2015) , but di¤ers because the focus here is not on a carbon tax per se. Instead, I focus on the level of global ambition each country would like to see through a uniformly applied marginal cost on emissions, which can be implemented in countries through any choice of policy instruments. 21 Let s denote a minimum marginal cost on emissions that all countries inter-nalize. We can then write each country's associated level of emissions as
This expression is equivalent to each country's demand for emissions with a price ‡oor at its DSCC, re ‡ecting how a country would choose to internalize i rather than some s < i . It follows that each country's preference for a uniformly implemented marginal cost of emissions comes from solving
Note that i is the only marginal damage that matters from country i's perspective. The solution to (13), denoteds i , will satisfy
The important feature about this condition is that the right-hand side includes the avoided marginal damages to country i of lower emissions in country i and all other countries. 22 We can thus de…ne the following:
De…nition 3 (SSCC) The Strategic Social Cost of Carbon iss i for all i.
I now consider how a country's SSCC compares with its DSCC and the GSCC, before turning to some empirical evidence and various decision rules for aggregating preferences. 22 I have implicitly assumed that the second-order condition for a global maximum is sat-is…ed. A su¢ cient (though not necessary) condition that I will use to illustrate some results is for all countries to have linear demand for emissions. This means that x 00 i (s) = B 000
i (x i (s))x 0 i (s)=B 00 i (x i (s)) 2 = 0, which implies B 000 i (x i (s)) = 0. It also implies that (13) is globally concave, as the second derivative of the objective function simpli…es to x 0 i (s i ) < 0.
Comparison with DSCC and GSCC
Let us …rst consider the DSCC. Rearranging (14) and using (4), we have
Because B 00 i (x i ) < 0, it follows that x i (s i ) < x i ( i ) and therefores i > i . This implies that a country would choose a uniformly internalized marginal cost on emissions higher than i ; that is, its SSCC is greater than it DSCC. The reason follows immediately from the comparison between (4) and (14): when choosings i , a country enjoys the additional bene…t of "forcing"other countries to lower their emissions, and this provides an incentive to increase the domestically internalized cost beyond i . 23 Turning now to a comparison with A, it is useful to begin with all identical countries. Recognizing the symmetry of solutions and suppressing subscripts, equation (14) The immediate implication is thats = A. In other words, with all identical countries, each country would choose a SSCC equal to the GSCC, and as we have seen, this is consistent with Pareto optimal emissions.
But the same result does not hold in general with heterogeneity among countries. To see the di¤erent mechanisms at work, let us make the further simplifying assumption of linear demand for emissions in each country. Letting x 0 i (s) = b i for all i, we can rewrite and simplify (14) as
The general result is that each country's choice ofs i can be greater than or less than A. This follows immediately from (15) because the right-hand side does not depend on j for all j 6 = i, which gives wide latitude for the second term to be greater than or less than A i . To build intuition for the di¤erent possibilities, it is useful to consider the simple case where n = 2. If we simplify even further by assuming b i = b j , it is easy to see from (15) thats i R A(= i + j ) if and only if i R j . This implies not only that a country with greater marginal damages chooses a greater SSCC; a country's SSCC will be greater than the GSCC when it has relatively higher marginal damages. In this case, there is an incentive to force the other country to lower emissions, with overall reductions more than are Pareto optimal. It is also useful to consider the case of i = j and heterogenous demand, wherebỹ s i R A if and only if b j =b i R 1, and recall that b i ; b j < 0. This means that country i will choose a SSCC greater (lower) than the GSCC if and only if country j has a more (less) responsive demand for emissions. The reason is that country i does not experience the greater (less) marginal cost of foregone emissions in country j when determining its preference for a uniform marginal cost on emissions. 24 In summary, all countries will have a SSCC greater than their own DSCC, but possibly greater than or less than the GSCC. The fact that some countries may prefer a uniform marginal cost of emissions greater than the GSCC is at …rst somewhat counter-intuitive, but becomes clear when considering how these are countries with relatively ‡at demand for emissions, large marginal damages, or both. These are in e¤ect the countries that would like to see a very stringent global emissions policy, a view certainly consistent with those of the small island nations.
Empirical Evidence and Decision Rules
I provide some empirical evidence on the SSCC for di¤erent countries and regions using the C-DICE model (Nordhaus 2015) . Consistent with the parameterization discussed in Section 4, I assume a GSCC of $40, the distribution of DSCCs shown in Figure 2 , and bene…t functions described in footnote 12. Figure 6 lists the SSCC for each country or region. They range from a low of $13 for Eurasia 24 A further result worth noting with linear demand is the possibility fors i = A for all i even with heterogenous countries. Although it is a knife-edged result, the condition will hold if all countries have the same ratio of marginal costs to bene…ts of emissions; that is, the ratio i =b i is the same for all i. To see this, note that the identical ratio condition requires b j = b i ( j = i ) for all j and i, and substitution into (15) yields a right-hand side equal to A. Figure 7 : Single-peaked preferences for the SSCC for countries or regions, given a GSCC of $40 to a high of $91 for India. The countries and regions are almost evenly split between those with a SSCC below and above the GSCC of $40. Figure 6 also illustrates preferences for the SSCC graphically. Each country or region's net bene…t (normalized to its maximum at the SSCC) is shown on a curve for di¤erent levels of a globally internalized shadow value on emissions. These curves show how preferences for the SSCC are single-peaked; that is, a country or region's net bene…t declines as the shadow price moves away from its preferred SSCC.
The set of preferences illustrated in Figure 6 provide a basis for studying how countries might agree on a uniformly implemented shadow value on emissions. Weitzman (2014 Weitzman ( , 2015 considers a thought experiment involving a …ctitious World Climate Assembly that votes on a uniform carbon tax. But the need for such preference aggregation can apply more generally to a globally internalized shadow price, regardless of the policy instrument. This might arise as part of an international agreement, where, for example, Aldy and Pizer (2016) discuss benchmarking levels of ambition based on implicit prices of carbon. More immediately, multilateral development agencies, such as the World Bank, emphasize the need to account for a SCC in program evaluation that voting member countries must approve. 25 In what follows, I assume countries must agree on a single, minimum SCC that all countries internalize. Let D : R n ! R 1 denote a decision rule that maps n country preferences for the SSCC into a single number, denoted DCC for "decision cost of carbon."I consider several voting rules to study how they a¤ect the DCC. 26 Table 1 lists the di¤erent rules and corresponding estimates of the DCC. The natural starting point is majority voting, for which the standard result is that the outcome will re ‡ect preferences of the median voter. In this case, the median voter is Brazil, and the DCC is $45. As a point of comparison, the table also reports the mean SSCC corresponding to each voting scheme, and in all cases, the mean is close to the median. Other voting schemes are a population weighted majority at $51 and a GDP weighted majority at $46. Given the way that UNFCCC decision making is based on consensus, I also consider the largest shadow value that would achieve unanimous support in the sense that no country would prefer the In all cases, the number is higher than the $30 currently used at the World Bank.
Conclusion
This paper contributes a theoretical foundation for the SCC to a literature that focuses almost exclusively on producing empirical estimates. The basic framework highlights this distinction between the DSCC and the GSCC, and relates them to the conditions of Pareto optimality and Nash equilibrium for a global public bad. The model helps frame the growing debate about whether countries should take account of the global bene…ts of reducing greenhouse-gas emissions when setting and evaluating domestic policy. At its core, the distinction relies on a determination of the appropriate extent of a market for e¢ cient provision of a global public good. Analysis also shows how choices between the DSCC and the GSCC are subject to distributional e¤ects in addition well-known free riding incentives. Extensions of the model identify conditions under which a country's decision to internalize the GSCC, or at least something greater than the DSCC, can be individually rational. To capture international relations where a country reduces its own emissions to leverage reductions from other countries, I consider non-Nash behavior with a conjectural variations approach. As another alternative, I extend the model to a repeated game that accounts for the way international negotiations to mitigate climate change take place repeatedly over time. Folk Theorem type results prove useful in this context. In both cases, it can be in a country's self interest to internalize the GSCC, as currently practiced in regulatory impact analysis by a growing number of countries. But countries may not agree on the same value of the GSCC, and understanding why is consistent with the notion of a strategic SCC that I develop here. Seeking one estimate of the GSCC upon which all sovereign countries can agree abstracts from each country's strategic incentives. I show how all countries prefer a SSCC that is greater than their DSCC, but can be less than or greater than the GSCC. Empirical evidence based on the C-DICE model shows how countries or regions would prefer a globally internalized shadow value on emissions that ranges from $13 (Eurasia) to $91 (India) when the actual GSCC is $40. Di¤erent voting schemes for preference aggregation, however, result in shadow values relatively close to the GSCC.
In conclusion, a central contribution of this paper is demonstration of the need to more research on the theoretical underpinnings of the SCC. I have sought to show how establishing and using the GSCC among sovereign countries is not simply a case of estimating and internalizing an externality. While the theoretical treatments and empirical demonstrations are intentionally simple, they open the door to future research with potentially important insights to guide the estimation and use of the SCC and inform the design of future climate policy.
